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PUNITIVE SEGREGATION IN STATE PRISONSTHE NEED FOR DEFINITE TIME LIMITATIONS

I.

INTRODUCTION

During the past several decades there have been a number of
prison revolts. Many penologists, judges, lawyers, former prisoners, and politicians who have been associated with the penal system
in the United States have argued in favor of nationwide reforms.
It is submitted that some of the most rudimentary reforms may
now be possible in the aftermath of one particular revolt. On September 9, 1971, a prison revolt occurred at Attica State Prison, Attica, New York.' As a consequence of that revolt, the efficacy of
the entire American penal system is undergoing a convulsive reexamination. 2 On one hand, American prisons have been depicted
as places where there are "armed guards set to herd animals." On
as being among the "most
the other hand, they have been described
4
humane and advanced in the world."
It is a sociological truism that some sanctions, such as imprisonment, are necessary to enforce society's rules of conduct. 5 Once
1. TIME MAGAZINE, Sept. 27, 1971, at 20. Violence began when a
group of inmates refused to line up for a work detail. The convicts rushed
through the cell block setting fires and wielding makeshift weapons.
The riot culminated in an assault by New York State Troopers on the
prison compound; the result was 27 dead and many wounded. Id. at 24.
2. Id. at 19. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1971, at 24, col. 2 (editorial):
The mood in prisons is tense because drug addiction, sexual frustration, antisocial resentments, racial hurts, criminal guilt and
fantasies of escape create tensions. A prison is a community of
defeated men.
Knowing all this, the public has to ask itself whether it is prepared to pay the price in higher taxes to provide more buildings,
more professional staff, better-trained guards, better food and
higher wages for work done by prison inmates....
Id.
3. Wicker, The Animals At Attica, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1971, at 43,
col. 3. But see Oswald, 'New Directions', N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1971, at 43,
col. 5:
The main impact of the new direction for the department [of Corrections] is the recognition of the individual as a human being
and the need for basic fairness throughout our day-to-day relaship with each other.
Id.
4. Agnew, The 'Root Causes' of Attica, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1971, at
41, col. 2.
5. See e.g., Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative,
Moralizing, and Habituative Effects, 1969 WIs. L. REV. 550:
It is sufficient to note than in our society, if it is to continue in

a person is imprisoned, however, a fundamental question arises:
Is he to be denied all rights as a human being,6 or does he retain
certain basic rights? 7 The traditional view of penology emphasizes
that incarceration "requires deprivation of all rights." s The prisoner is to be punished rather than be rehabilitated.9 The modern
view, however, emphasizes treatment of the prisoner which will
eventually aid his return to society. 10 Accordingly, the modem
view" favors the retention of basic constitutional rights during incarceration.
The courts have, in the past, generally maintained a "hands2
off" doctrine in their determination as to which view to support.'
An unfortunate consequence of the hands-off doctrine is to deny to a
prisoner judicial review of his grievances, especially those arising
of alleged mistreatment while in prison. There is a recent trend,
however, for increased judicial inquiry
into alleged deprivations of
13
constitutional rights of prisoners.
The evaluation of the rights of a prisoner during incarceration
is directly related to developments in the theories of punishment.

existence, there must be general acceptance of authoritive regulation as a means of achieving social control. ...
Id. at 557.
6. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
CORRECTIONS, at 82-83
(1967).
7. See, e.g., Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944):
A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly or by necessary implication, taken from him
by law. While the law does take his liberty and imposes a duty
of servitude and observance of discipline for his regulation and
that of other prisoners, it does not deny his right to personal security against unlawful invasion.
When a man possesses a substantial right, the courts will be
diligent in finding a way to protect it....
Id. at 445.
8. See, e.g., Note, Suits by Black Muslim Prisoners to Enforce Religious Rights-Obstacles to A Hearing On The Merits, 20 RUTGERS L. REV.
528 (1966).
9. See note 15 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., BARNES AND TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY
at 644-83 (9th ed. 1950). See also Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804
(E.D. Ark.), vacated, 404 F.2d 571, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1968).
11. For purposes of this Comment, "modern view" is used interchangeably with "new penology." See TIME MAGAZINE, Sept. 27, 1971, at
26, col. 3:
Today the presumed goals of prisons are various, and sometimes
they conflict. The aims are to wreck society's vengeance on a
criminal, to deter other men from violating the law, to rehabilitate a prisoner so that he is fit to return to the open world....
Id.
12. Compare Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1961)
with Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 389 U.S.
967 (1967). See generally, Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
13. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Wright
v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443
(6th Cir. 1944).
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II.

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

14

One of the earliest theories of punishment justified punishment
as "a return for moral evil."' 5 The theory's basic philosophy was
that once a person commits a crime, society must be avenged.1 6
This retributive theory is best described as being punishment merely
for the sake of revenge. 17 In colonial times retributive punishment
was applied without regard for the nature or severity of the offense.
For example, in 1679 a Frenchman who was only suspected of setting a fire in the city of Boston "was ordered to stand in the pillory,
have both ears cut off, pay the charges of the court, and lie in prison
on bonds of five hundred pounds ..
,"" The retributive theory became synonymous with harsh corporal punishment. Tearing out the
tongue, cutting off the lips, and tearing off the ears were routinely
employed. 19 The attitude of the colonists toward a person who was
considered to be a criminal has been summed up vividly:
Our ancestors were not squeamish. The sight of a man
lopped of his ears, or split of his nostrils, or with a seared
brand or great gash in his forehead or check could not affect the stout stomachs that cheerfully and eagerly20 gathered
around the bloody whipping-post and the gallows.
The underlying justification for punishment, revenge for society, en21
couraged little compassion for the criminal.
The development of the deterrence theory of punishment
brought about a significant advancement in penology.2 2 According
14. For purposes of discussion, each theory will be discussed separately. It should be noted, however, in practice all theories are mergedthe difference is merely a matter of degree as to which theory is given
more effect.
15.

HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONsiBIITy, 81 (1968).

16.
17.

Id.
Id.

18.

EARLE, CuRIous PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS, 41 (1896).

19. See Durkheim, Two Laws of Penal Evolution, 38 CINN. L. REV.
32, 43 (1969).
See generally, EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE
DAYS (1896). Long hair once had a utilitarian value-it was used to hide
deformities such as loss of ears. Id.
20. EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS, 138 (1896).
21. Id. at 58:
[T] he sight of an author or a publisher with his ear nailed to a
pillory was too common to be widely noted, for anyone who
printed without permission could, by the law of the land, be
thus treated; when the author was released, if his bleeding ear was
left on the pillory, that did not matter.
22. The deterrent theory is discussed in its classical meaning i.e., use
of fear or intimidation to discourage certain conduct. For an extensive
discussion of the interrelationship of the deterrent theory with the reformative theory see Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and Habituative Effects, 1969 WIs. L. REV. 550.

to this theory, an individual is deterred from deviations in conduct
because of a conscious fear of punishment.2 3 It is important to note
that this theory placed less emphasis on the moral evil of the offense than did the retributive theory. 24 The result of this shift
in emphasis was the gradual acceptance of proportionate punishment: 25 punishment which varies according to the gravity of the
offense. 26 A traffic offense, for instance, does not warrant the same
punishment as murder. Complementing the growth of this theory
was the growing public rejection of the harsher methods of punishment imposed under a retributive philosophy. 27 A corollary of the
idea of proportionate punishment is that people who commit the
28
same type of offense should be punished as similarly as possible.
Standards of decency in methods of punishment were begining to
emerge.2 9
The most recent advance in penology is the development and
growing acceptance of the reformative theory of punishment. This
theory "embraces any strengthening of the offender's disposition
and capacity to keep within the law, which is intentionally brought
about by human effort otherwise than through fear ....

"30

The

predominant characteristic of this theory is an attempt to rehabilitate the criminal and prepare him to return to society.3 1 The
32
dignity of the individual is the keystone of the reformative theory.
Sanctions are not applied to degrade the offender; rather, they are
used to correct the deviation from orderly conduct. This theory
of punishment supports the retention of rights while the prisoner is
incarcerated. If the reformative theory is to function properly,
methods of punishment must not interfere with certain individual
rights.
As the theories of punishment have progressed to the point at
which individual rights are recognized, the places of imprisonment
evolved into the present day "correctional institution. '33 Compare
the present day situation to the time when a prison was a repressive
environment where prisoners were subjected to all forms of phy23. See Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 550, 552.
24. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY at 237 (1968).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Durkheim, Two Laws of Penal Evolution, 38 CINN.
L. REV. 32, 44 (1969).
27. See generally, Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
and The Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv.L. REV. 635 (1966).
28. Id. at 636.
29. Id.
30. HART, PUNISHMNT AND RESPONSIBILITY at 26 (1968).
31. Id.
32. Cf. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
See generally, Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and The
Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 635 (1966).
33. See generally, Durkheim, Two Laws of Penal Evolution, 38 CINN.
L. REV. 32, 49 (1969).
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sical abuse.34 Although many modern prisons are in need of
drastic renovation and improvement, physical maltreatment of prisoners is prohibited by law, although in fact it does occur occasion5
ally
Changes in the theory of penology have been slow. One reason
is that the courts have traditionally maintained a "hands off" position when prison affairs were concerned, leaving the changes to
the legislative and executive branches of government. However, increasing demand for reform coupled with continued inaction on the
part of legislators and prison authorities has forced the judiciary
to consider problems of prison administration that were avoided in
the past. One area of internal prison administration which has had
increased judicial scrutiny in recent years is the internal disciplinary
procedures of prisons. In some areas the courts are now setting
limits on prison disciplinary measures.
This Comment will examine the issue of whether a prisoner
who is confined to punitive segregation 6 for an indefinite period of
time is by that fact subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.
34. Id.
In Dahomey, the prison was a hole like a well, where the condemned stagnated in filth and vermin. In Judea, we have seen
that the prison was made of wooden cages in which the scarcely
fed prisoners were confined....
35. See note 122 infra.
36. For purposes of this Comment, "punitive segregation" refers to the
isolation of a certain prisoner from the general prison population. Such
segregation is a disciplinary action invoked by prison officials against a
prisoner who violates prison rules. Punitive segregation can be imposed
only by prison officials. Solitary confinement, on the other hand, is a
broader term and may be imposed as a statutory sanction. See, e.g., PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4302 (1939). The general purpose of punitive segregation is discussed in Graham v. Willingham, 265 F. Supp. 763 (D. Kan.
1967):
The objectives of inmate discipline and control are consonant
with the correctional objectives of the institution, the focus being
on individual adjustment and institutional community welfare.
In this context, the purpose of segregating inmates from the general population is to insure immediate control and supervision of
inmates who are a threat to themselves, to others or the safety
and security of the institution.
Id. at 765. The conditions of punitive segregation often vary from one
prison to another. Compare Sostre v. McGinnis, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.
N.Y.), rev'd, 442 F.2d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1971) (running water, regular
exercise, clothes), with Wright v. McMann, 257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 387 F.2d 519, 521 (2d Cir. 1967) (no hygienic implements, exposure
to subfreezing temperatures, unsanitary conditions).
This Comment is limited to situations in which a prisoner in a state
prison seeks relief through the federal courts.

III. JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS
The first question facing such a prisoner is whether or not the
federal courts will take jurisdiction of his petition. Until 1961, state
prison inmates who alleged improper treatment while in prison were
forced to seek relief in the state courts.3 7 Alleged mistreatment of
such prisoners was considered within the realm of "internal discipline" of prison administration; therefore, the federal courts declined
jurisdiction.38 This "hands off" attitude is illustrated in Blythe
v. Ellis, 39 where an inmate of a Texas prison brought suit against the
prison director for the latter's alleged violations of the civil rights
of the prisoner. 40 The plaintiff had been placed in punitive segregation by the defendant not long after the plaintiff had undergone
surgery. 41 The plaintiff alleged that as a result of such segregation, his sickness was aggravated, resulting in the need for additional
surgery. 42 The District Court for the Southern District of Texas refused to apply the terms of the eighth amendment to the states. 43
The court concluded that no cause of action had been stated: "The
court is of the opinion that defendant's alleged conduct constitutes 'internal discipline.' Referal courts do not inquire into such
matters as solitary confinement. . . . '44
The court did concede,
however, that deprivation of essential medical care or infliction
45
of serious bodily injury would be actionable.
An additional roadblock for the state prisoner seeking relief
in the federal courts for prison mistreatment was the requirement
that he exhaust his administrative and judicial remedies within the
state before the federal courts would take jurisdiction. The general rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted before
judicial relief would be granted was followed in early instances
where state prisoners sought relief in the federal courts. 46 A series
of decisions based on actions brought by state prisoners alleging
violations of their civil rights has now cleared the path for actions
by state prisoners in federal courts without lengthy state judicial
and administrative proceedings.
In cases involving civil rights it was held that one could resort
to a federal court without first exhausting the judicial remedies of
37. See, e.g., Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233, 234 (2d Cir. 1961).
38. See, e.g., Blythe v. Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
39. 194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
40. Id. at 139.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 140. But see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(refused to apply to the states the protection against cruel and unusual
punishment provided by the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution).
44. Blythe v. Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 139, 140 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Aircraft and Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S.
752 (1947).
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state courts. 47 The requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies in certain actions brought under the Civil Rights Act was
repudiated in McNeese v. Board of Education.4" However, in
United States v. Pennsylvania,"9 the court refused to apply the
McNeese holding to actions by state prisoners against prison officials. In this decision a state prisoner sought to enjoin prison officials from denying him the use of a law library as well as access
to various legal sources.50 Suit was initiated under the Civil Rights
Act.51 The court refused to eliminate the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
Accordingly, this court therefore concludes that inmates of
state correctional institutions must, before invoking the aid
of the Civil Rights Act, first exhaust their administrative
remedies or make a52satisfactory showing that they were in
fact unable to do so.

47.

See Lang v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939):
To vindicate his present grievance the plaintiff did not have to
pursue whatever remedy may have been open to him in the state
courts. Normally, the state legislative process, sometimes exercised through administrative powers conferred on state courts,
must be completed before resort to the federal courts can be had.
. . . But the state procedure open for one in the plaintiff's situation . . . has all the indicia of a conventional judicial proceeding. . . . Barring only exceptional circumstances . . . resort to a
federal court may be had without first exhausting the judicial
remedies of state courts.
Id. at 274. See also U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1964):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (1948):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . .
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege
or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or
by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ...
Id.
48. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
49. 247 F. Supp, 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
50. Id. at 8.

51.

Id.

52. Id. at 11. The court based its conclusion on a fear of interfering
with prison discipline rather than on a consideration of deprivation of
constitutional rights of the prisoner.
[F]ederal courts will not interfere with uniformly applied prison
regulations designed to achieve the discipline indispensable to the
orderly operation of a state penal institution. ...
Id. at 12.

In Wright v. McMann,5 however, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is
not required in a civil rights action by a prisoner against prison officials. 54 Wright involved a claim by a state prisoner that his constitutional rights were violated when he was placed in a "strip
cell."55 The court reviewed the question of whether involvement at
the federal level was permissible, 56 and concluded:
[W]hile federal courts are sensitive to the problems created by judicial interference in the internal discipline of

state prisons, in appropriate cases they will not hesitate to
intervene.

. .

.57

It is submitted that the portion of the holding in United States
58
v. Pennsylvania
requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies is clearly out of line with the trend of later case law. There
is no longer any question that a prisoner can bring an action under
the Civil Rights Act without first exhausting judicial and administrative remedies at the state level. 59

IV. THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUNITIVE SEGREGATION

Until 1962 when the United States Supreme Court held the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment applicable to the states in Robinson v. California,60 the constitutionality
of punitive segregation had never been determined. Based on
the general rule that punishment is not "cruel and unusual" un53. 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
54. Id. at 522.
55. Id. at 521. (The strip cell had no furniture other than a sink and
toilet. Such cell had inadequate heat, and the prisoner was denied all
hygienic implements. He was exposed to subfreezing temperatures).
56. Id. at 522:
Until recently the federal courts refused to review charges instituted under the Civil Rights Act and arising out of state prison
disciplinary procedures. The prisoners, instead, were left to pursue whatever remedies were available in the state courts. The oft
repeated reasons used to justify this result were (a) that the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment did not apply to the states: (b) a reluctance to interfere in
the internal discipline of state prisons, and (c) the need to utilize
state remedies in the first instance....
57.

58.

Id.

247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965).

See text accompanying notes

49-52 supra.

59. See, e.g., Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969):
As to the matter of exhaustion of state remedies, it is presently the
rule that where an action is appropriately brought under provisions of the Civil Rights Act, the exhaustion of state remedies is
not a condition precedent to federal jurisdiction. State and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction in such cases....
Id. at 790. See also, Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); Cooper v.
Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1966).
The requirement that state administrative remedies must first be exhausted
does apply, however, in a habeas corpus proceeding, Smart v. Avery, 411
F.2d 408, 409 (6th Cir. 1969) ("The Civil Rights Statute cannot be used by
a state prisoner to circumvent the requirement of the statute ..
60. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

less exotic methods of punishment are employed or traditional
punishment is applied excessively, it is now well-established that
punitive segregation in and of itself does not violate the eighth
amendment. 61
The primary justification for this view appears to be the reluctance of the courts to interfere with prison disciplinary procedures unless there is a deprivation of the prisoner's constitutional
rights. 62 But the courts still refuse to question the basic premise
that punitive segregation, in and of itself, does not deprive the
prisoner of his constitutional rights.
A representative case is Courtney v. Bishop 3' which involved a
complaint by a prisoner that he had been arbitrarily placed in punitive segregation. 6 4 The prisoner had been afforded a hearing be65
fore a district court; his complaint was subsequently dismissed.
The court recognized that lawful incarceration deprives a prisoner
of certain rights and privileges;66 yet the court refused to hold that
incarceration causes forfeiture of all rights.6 7 The plaintiff conceded, in Courtney, that punitive segregation is not unconstitutional per se.6 8 Courtney gives added credence to the argument
that prison officials must be given leeway in administering disci61. See Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Ford v.
Board of Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir.
1969); Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
915 (1969); Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967); Knight
v. Rogen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965);
Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970); Roberts v. Barbosa, 227
F. Supp. 20 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
62. See, e.g., Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969)
where it is stated:
As to the traditional preference for leaving matters of internal prison management to state officials, an analysis of recent
cases indicates that while federal courts are still sensitive to the
problems created by interference of the federal judiciary in matters involving the internal discipline of state prisons, they will not
hesitate to intervene in appropriate cases. That this intervention
may extend to an examination of maximum security procedures in
state prisons in order to insure the protection of constitutional
rights is amply supported by precedent. . . . While the rule remains that matters of state prison discipline are not ordinarily
subject to examination in federal court, the rule is otherwise if the
treatment of prisoners is of such a nature that their constitutional
rights are violated.
Id. at 791.
63. 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969).
64. Id. at 1186. The prisoner claimed there was inadequate food and
medical care. He also alleged that numerous beatings were inflicted upon
the prisoner by prison officials.
65. Id. at 1186.
66. Id. at 1187.
67. Id.
68. Id.

plinary rules. It appears that before a prisoner can receive judicial relief from punitive segregation, he must prove that the conditions of punitive segregation violate the eighth amendment.
A rule has evolved under which punitive segregation will be
held unconstitutional 9 if certain standards of human decency
are not met. 70 Wright v. McMann 1 involved a complaint by a state
prisoner that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because of the conditions of his confinement. 72 The prisoner was
forced to sleep completely nude on a cold concrete floor 73 in a cell
which was "reeking from the stench of the bodily wastes of previous
7 4
occupants which he says covered the floor, the sink, and toilet."
Although fearful that the decision would result in the filing of
similar complaints throughout the district,7 5 the court concluded
such conditions were so inhumane as to constitute cruel and unusual
76

punishment.

In Hancock v. Avery77 the prisoner was placed in punitive seggregation and was not given any clothes to wear,78 or any hy69. For a general but thorough discussion of what may constitute
"excessive" punishment under the eighth amendment see Note, The Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause and The Substantive Criminal Law, 79
HARv. L. REv. 635 (1966).
70. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Wright
v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Jordon v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp.
674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
71. 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (See note 53 and accompanying text
supra).
72. 387 F.2d at 521. The prisoner alleged:
[T]he said solitary confinement cell wherein plaintiff was
placed was dirty, filthy and unsanitary, without adequate heat and
virtually barren; the toilet and sink were encrusted with slime,
dirt and human excremental residue superimposed thereon; plaintiff was without clothing and entirely nude for several days . . .
until he was given a thin pair of underwear to put on; plaintiff
was unable to keep himself clean or perform normal hygienic
functions as he was denied the use of soap, towel .

.

. and other

hygienic implements; plaintiff was compelled under threat of violence, assault or other increased punishments to remain standing at military attention in front of his cell door each time an
officer appeared from 7:30 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. every day, and he
was not permitted to sleep during the said hours under the pain
and threat of being beaten or otherwise disciplined therefore; the
windows in front of his confinement cell were opened wide
throughout the evening and night hours of each day during subfreezing temperatures causing plaintiff to be exposed to the cold
air and winter weather without clothing or other means of protecting himself ...

Id.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 522.
75. Id. at 527.
76. Id. at 526.
The subhuman condition in the 'strip cell' . . . could only serve to
destroy completely the spirit and undermine the sanity of the
The Eighth Amendment forbids treatment so foul, so inuman and so violative of basic concepts of decency...

grisoner.
Id.
77.
78.

301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
Id. at 789.
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genic materials.7 9 At the rear of the cell was a hole used to receive
bodily wastes; the flushing operation was controlled by a guard
and was carried out five times every twenty-four hours.8 0 The defendants, who were prison officials, argued that the methods of dealing with allegedly "incorrigible" persons such as the plaintiff should
be left to the discretion of prison administrators."' The defendants further argued that lack of clothing and hygienic material
was necessary to prevent the plaintiff from injuring himself.8 2 The
court concluded the debasing conditions to which plaintiff was subjected did amount to cruel and unusual punishment. s 3 Hancock
recognized that application of the eighth amendment should remain
flexible.8 4 Two tests were applied to aid in the determination of
whether the eighth amendment should be applied in a given case.8 5
It is significant that Hancock held such conditions to be cruel and
unusual when imposed "for any length of time, however brief."' 6
By refusing to deprive the prisoner of all his rights during punitive segregation the Hancock decision encourages more humane
treatment of prisoners than have previous decisions.
The conditions of punitive segregation have been held to be in
violation of the eighth amendment when punitive segregation is
imposed in such a way as to be "grossly disproportionate" to the
offense.8 7 In Fulwood v. Clemmer, s a Muslim prisoner had allegedly broken a prison rule which forbade conduct that would
tend to break the peace.8 9 The prisoner was put in punitive segre79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 792.
84. The court stated:
Just what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense is a matter which defies concrete definition.
However, it has long been understood that the concept of cruel
and unusual punishment is one of wide application capable of
acquiring new depths of meaning to conform to more enlightened
concepts of criminal justice.
Id.at 791.
85. Id. One test is whether the punishment "shocks general conscience"; the other is when a punishment goes beyond what is necessary to
achieve a legitimate penal aim.
86. Id. at 792 (emphasis added). See note 112 and accompanying
text infra.
87. See, e.g., Sostre v. Rockefeller, 309 F. Supp. 611, 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), rev'd in part sub nom., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971).
88. 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
89. The rule read in part:
It is against the law to engage in a demonstration, disturbance, strike, or act of resistance, either alone or in combination

gation for over two years 0 The court explicitly recognized that the
racial preachings of the prisoner were in violation of the prison
rule. 91 Nevertheless, the court found the penalty of punitive segregation to be disproportionate to the offense:
Despite the power of prison authorities to make proper rules
and regulations for the government of prisoners, and to
maintain discipline in the prison population, a prisoner may
not be unreasonably punished for the infraction of a rule. A
punishment out of proportion to the violation may
2 bring it
within the bar against unreasonable punishments
As discussed above, 93 exotic and barbaric methods of punishment are not permissible. Thus, courts have recognized that even
while a man is incarcerated he is entitled to certain basic protections.
The prisoner does forfeit, of course, many rights he would normally
have if he were a "free" man,9 4 and the rights of a prisoner are
circumscribed by the need for prison discipline. Nevertheless, this
limitation must always reasonably relate to the maintenance of prison discipline and not constitute an arbitrary and capricious disregard of human rights.95
Punitive segregation has consistently been upheld as a proper
exercise of discretion of prison officials.9 6 But the Clemmer and
Hancock decisions have recognized that the conditions and term of
punitive segregation must meet certain minimum standards of decency and reasonableness; otherwise, punitive segregation in a
given instance will be considered violative of the eighth amendment.
V.

SOSTRE V. ROCKEFELLER-IMPOSING
ON

PuNrIVE

SEGREGATION:

DEFINITE LIMITATIONS

ADVANCE AND RETREAT

The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York has extended the doctrine enunciated in Clemmer and in
Hancock;97 unfortunately, this progressive and stimulating approach
was reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals." In Sostre v.
with others, which will tend to breach the peace or which constitutes disorderly conduct.
Id. at 378.
90. Id. at 379.
91. Id. at 378.
92. Id. at 379.
93. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
94. See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). Cf., Jackson v.
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1969).
95. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 276 F. Supp.
637 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247
F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
96. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
97. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in
part sub nom, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). See also
McCray v. State, 40 U.S.L.W. 2307 (Nov. 11, 1971).
98. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Rockfeller"0 the plaintiff, a prisoner at Green Haven Prison, New
York State, brought a civil rights action100 against the Governor of
New York, the Commissioner of Corrections and the wardens of two
New York state prisons.' 0 ' The plaintiff had previously spent
twelve years in prison, four of which were in punitive segregation
at Attica State Prison. 10 2 The plaintiff had been extremely active
in attempting to secure legal rights for other prisoners. 0 3 At the
time of suit the plaintiff was in prison pursuant to a sentence of
30-40 years for selling narcotics. 04 He was confined to an otherwise empty cell block at Attica for one night, then transferred to
Green Haven. 0 5 The plaintiff initiated a legal battle for reversal
of his conviction but was immediately placed in punitive segregation.'
He was released from punitive segregation for several
days but was again confined to punitive segregation, this time
for more than one year.10 A temporary restraining order allowed
his release to the general prison population. 0 8 The defendants
argued that the plaintiff was a dangerous prisoner and his continued presence in punitive segregation was essential to prison security. 1 9 There was evidence that the defendants had attempted to
discourage the plaintiff from engaging in legal activities. 110
The district court in Sostre found that plaintiff was kept in
99. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Discussion of this case is confined to the issue pertaining to length of confinement in punitive segregation. In an exhaustive opinion the court addressed itself to issues of due
process, freedom of political thought and compensatory and punitive dam-

ages.
100. See note 47 supra.
101. 312 F. Supp. at 866.
102. Id.
103. 312 F. Supp. at 866. Plaintiff was a "jailhouse lawyer" and
helped other prisoners secure certain legal rights. See Sostre v. McGinnis,
334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
104. 312 F. Supp. at 866.
105. Id. The deputy warden of Attica stated the reason for the transfer: "I thought it was best for the interests of the inmate and for the state
that this man be transferred to another institution." Id. at 867.
106. Id. at 867. The conditions of punitive segregation at Green Haven
included: restricted diet; shower and shave with hot water once a week;
denial of access to library, newspapers and movies, loss of group privileges.
107. Id.
108. See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 309 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
109. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Defendants base their reasoning on the contents of a letter written by the prisoner
to his sister. Portions of the letter stated:
As for me, there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that I
will be out soon, either by having my appeal reversed in the courts
or by being liberated by the Universal Forces of Liberation. . ..
Id. at 867.
110. Id. at 867.

punitive segregation not because of any serious infraction of prison
rules but, rather, "because he is unquestionably, a black militant
who persists in writing and expressing his militant and radical ideas
in prison.""' The court specifically stated:
[P] unitive segregation under the conditions to which plaintiff was subjected at Green Haven is physically harsh, destructive of morale, dehumanizing in the sense that it is
needlessly degrading, and dangerous to the maintenance of
sanity when continued for more than a short
112 period of time
which should certainly not exceed 15 days.
In other words, the district court in Sostre would require the
establishment of a definite time limit on confinement to punitive
segregation. The court found that punitive segregation as applied to
the instant plaintiff was clearly disproportionate to the offense. 11
The court also found the conditions of punitive segregation at Green
Haven to be "cruel and unusual punishment when tested against 'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society'. . . .114
It is clear from the decision: Extended periods of
confinement in punitive segregation are in violation of the eighth
amendment.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the critical portions of the holding of the district court holding pertaining to the
conditions of punitive segregation and the restriction on time a
prisoner can spend in punitive segregation. 1 5 The circuit court emphasized that the plaintiff was not totally isolated from human contact." 6 The court also emphasized the fact that plaintiff refused
to participate in a group therapy program." 7 Although the court
of appeals recognized the potential harm involved in extended periods of punitive segregation, the court apparently based its decision
on its own reluctance to interfere with prison disciplinary procedures." 8 The court did intimate its displeasure with indefinite confinement to punitive segregation under the conditions endured by
the plaintiff;" 9 yet the court refused to support the courageous ini111. Id. at 870.
112. Id. at 868.
113. Id. at 871. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
114. Id. at 871.
115. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). (Plaintiff did
not appeal from dismissal of Governor Rockefeller as a defendant).
116. Id. at 185. The court stated:
Although for four months only one other prisoner was confined
with Sostre in his small 'segment' of five cells, the entire punitive
segregation unit at Green Haven housed on the average about 15
prisoners at any one time....
Id.
117. Id. (Group therapy was a type of counselling in which the prisoner must participate in order to become eligible for release from punitive
segregation).
118. Id. at 191. "For a federal court . . . to place a punishment beyond the power of a state to impose on an inmate is a drastic interference
with the state's free political and administrative processes.... .Accord,
Graham v. Willingham, 265 F. Supp. 763, 765 (D. Kan. 1967).
119. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971).
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tiative of the district court in placing a definite time limit on puni120
tive segregation.
Another recent decision, McCroy v. State,' 21 has held that
there should be a fifteen day time limit on punitive segregation.
The decision appears to apply where the institution in question is
designated a "treatment" center rather than a maximum security
122
prison.
The decisions which have found the conditions of punitive
segregation to be unconstitutional in certain instances recognize that
the physical well-being of a prisoner is at stake. 2 3 Several state
legislatures have established a general policy of maintaining the
physical health of prisoners.124 The application of the eighth
amendment to the states 25 is additional evidence of a policy to maintain the physical health of a person during incarceration.
The district court in Sostre merely extended this policy to encompass the mental health of a prisoner. The court explicitly
stated:
Subjecting a prisoner to the demonstrated risk of the loss
of his sanity as punishment for any offense in prison is
plainly cruel and unusual punishment as judged by present
standards of decency. ... 126
Expert testimony introduced in Sostre pointedly recognized that
segregated confinement similar to that endured by the prisoner is
27
"degrading, dehumanizing, conducive to mental derangement."'
Even the circuit court in Sostre recognized the varacity of such
expert analysis. 128 It is beyond comprehension how an enlight120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. See text accompanying notes 112-114 supra.
40 U.S.L.W. 2307 (Nov. 11, 1971).
Id. at 2308.
See, e.g., Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 371 (1829):
From and after the first day of July next, all and every person
adjudged to suffer separate or solitary confinement at labor in
penitentiaries, shall be kept singly and separately at labor in
the cells or workyards of said prisons, and be sustained upon
wholesome food of a coarse quality, sufficient for the healthful
support of life, and be furnished with clothing suited to their situation...
Id. (emphasis supplied).
125. See generally, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
126. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Accord, Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967).
127. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 190 (2d Cir. 1971).
128. Id. The court stated:
Nor would candor permit us to dismiss these [expert] opinions
as aberrational among those views revealed in relevant sources referred to us by counsel or known to us through our own research.
To the contrary, it would not be misleading to characterize many

ened judiciary can state that "long-term isolation might have so serious an impact, in fact, as to 'destroy' a person's 'mentality' . . .
yet that same judiciary continues to refuse to place time limitations on such isolated confinement.
The circuit court in Sostre apparently maintains it is not qualified to determine whether a punishment should be placed beyond
the power of a state. 130 It is submitted that precisely because the
courts are qualified to prohibit excessive or exotic punishments
the barbaric tortures of the past are no longer permissible. 1 31 The
humanitarian decision of the district court in Sostre illustrates the
potential responsiveness of the judiciary to the modern view of pe132
nology.
VI.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INTERNAL PRISON DISCIPLINE

There is an emerging trend towards enlarging the area of judicial review of sanctions imposed upon prisoners by prison officials. 13 Certainly the mere fact of incarceration acts to deprive a
prisoner of rights he would otherwise enjoy. Yet some rights should
never be taken by the state. Ordinarily one of these is the right
to be free from conditions which can destroy the mental health of
the prisoner. It is conceded that some evils cannot be immediately
alleviated since incarceration is hardly conducive to mental health.
Prolonged punitive segregation, on the other hand, which aggravates
the mental torture of imprisonment, can and should be remedied
8 4
by an activist judiciary.
Admittedly, the court cannot "supervise minutely the operation of the prisons."'13 Certain leeway must be granted to prison
officials to apply sanctions to facilitate the orderly administration
of a prison. For example, Landman v. Peyton13 6 held that use of
tear gas approximately 12 to 15 times in the course of a year was
a legitimate exercise of disciplinary authority. 137 Also, a sanction
of the opinions of plaintiffs experts as fairly representative of the
perspective of adherents to the 'new penology" ....

Id. at 190.

129. Id.
130. Id. at 191.
131. See general text discussion pertaining to the theories of punishment at text accompanying notes 14-36 supra.
132. See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
See also, Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969):
The nineteenth century penology taught that incarceration "requires deprivation of all rights." In recent times there has been a
swing to the "new penology" which has as its promise that "men
are sent to prison as punishment rather than for punishment."
Id. at 1047.
133. See generally, Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962).
134. See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
135. See Edwards v. Sard, 250 F. Supp. 977, 978 (D.D.C. 1966). See
also, Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
136. 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir .1966).
137. See 370 F.2d at 138 n.2.
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such as punitive segregation may be applied to a particular prisoner
in order to protect the safety of the general prison population and
the guards. In Graham v. Willingham,3 8 the prisoner involved had
participated in violent acts against other inmates. The court
found that the punitive segregation of the violent inmate was a lawful exercise of authority. 13 9
This Comment does not suggest that prison officials be prohibited from the use of punitive segregation as a sanction. Rather,
the courts should declare that an indefinite confinement to punitive
segregation for any offense committed while in prison is prohibited
as a matter of law.140 It would be left to the discretion of prison
officials whether to apply, in a given instance, the sanction of punitive segregation for a definite period of time.
There may be a problem determining how long a prisoner must
be returned to the general prison population before he can be disciplined again by another definite period of punitive segregation.
One prisoner, for example, was released by court order from punitive segregation; immediately after such release, however, he was
confined to his cell because he had "dust on his cell bars.' 141 Repeated confinements to punitive segregation with relatively little time in the general prison population could constitute an "indefinite" confinement and thereby be prohibited.
If a prisoner repeatedly endangers the security of other prisoners and guards, he should be considered an "exception" to the
general rule. Until a more effective method of treating such a
person is developed, he could be confined to punitive segregation
for an indefinite time. However, such instances should truly be
the exception rather than the general rule. The burden of proof
should be on prison officials to justify continued re-sentencing of
any prisoner to punitive segregation. An administrative tribunal
could be established to determine on a case-by-case basis, whether a
particular resentencing is an abuse of discretion on the part of prison
officials. 142 But if a prisoner is placed in punitive segregation for
an indefinite period of time it should establish a prima facie case
of abuse of discretion, which could only be rebutted by clear and
138.

265 F. Supp. 763 (D. Kan.), aff'd, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967).

139. Id. at 368.
140. See, e.g., Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 871 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
141. Id. at 869.
142. For decisions involving procedural safeguards, see United States
ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1969); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F.
Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).

convincing evidence that the prisoner is a threat to the physical
well-being of the general prison population.
It is submitted that punitive segregation for an indefinite period of time is contrary to the modern preference of rehabilitation
over physical and mental degradation of a prisoner. Such punitive
segregation increases the mental abuse of a prisoner. 14 3 The current federal practice, however, urges the retention of prisoners in
punitive segregation "for as long as necessary to achieve the purposes intended," sometimes "indefinitely. ' 144 The present system
involves such a high potential for abuse that judicial caution in
"interfering" with prison administration is no longer justified. 145
It can be argued that punitive segregation for indefinite periods
of time is a valuable weapon in the bureau of corrections' arsenal
of disciplinary methods. Fear of such isolation may deter an inmate from violation of prison rules. Thus, by placing time restrictions on punitive segregation the courts are impeding the control
which prison officials maintain over their inmates. 46 The logical
extension of this argument is that any means by which47 prison officials can control their inmates are thereby justified.
As discussed above, however, certain limits do exist on the
means which prison officials can employ to maintain order and security. 48 By placing time limits on punitive segregation the courts
would merely be recognizing the obsolescence and cruelty of another form of punishment. Just as the severance of ears and fingers is no longer a proper method of punishment, 149 indefinite
confinement to punitive segregation can no longer be considered a
proper method of punishment.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is a delicate balance between the right of a prisoner to
be relatively free from mistreatment and the right of prison officials
to administer sanctions as disciplinary actions. In Rodriguez v. McGinnis,150 the court recognized that balance:
[T]here is full recognition by the federal courts that the
primary authority and responsibility for prison administration and discipline remains, and should remain, with the
State administrative personnel, and that the federal courts
143. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 192-93 (2d Cir. 1971).
144. Id. at 190.
145. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
146. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971).
147. See, e.g., a statement by the director of the School of Public
Administration at the University of Southern California, as reported in
TIME MAGAZINE, Sept. 27, 1971, at 26, col. 3 ("The idea of correcting anyone
in prison is bankrupt. You can't mix punishment and rehabilitation.
Prisons should be used for punishment.")
148. See note 66 supra.
149. See notes 14-36 and accompanying text supra.
150. 307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
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are never inclined to reach out to intrude unless,-and this
is an important "unless"-there is sufficient showing procedures and regulations exist that impair the constitutional
rights of prisoners. . . . This position is no more than a simple, common-sense one that is in accord with the American
desire for fairness within its prison systems.1" '
The judiciary should never abdicate its responsibility to protect
human rights. No matter how contemptible the crime, the accused
is entitled to a fair trial. When a man is convicted and imprisoned,
he is removed from free society, but not from the human race.
Judicial supervision of certain penal sanctions is permitted by
the eighth amendment. Courts must recognize that the mental
health of the prisoner is just as important as his physical health.
The real and potential harm resulting from punitive segregation
for an indefinite period of time outweighs the benefits resulting from
it. If the judiciary is to protect the dignity of the individual, it must
prohibit punitive segregation for an indefinite period of time.
CORREALE F. STEVENS

151.

Id. at 629.

